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Abstract—  After  more  than  a  decade  of  GM  crops, 
literature  reports  farmers  and  consumers  can  gain 
significantly from the technology, despite the intellectual 
property rights assigned to the innovator. In this paper 
we assess the effect of heterogeneity on this distribution 
of benefits. A two dimensional framework is created to 
assess the ex ante benefits of an innovation. Given this 
setting and the scarce data often available, a parametric 
modelling  approach  is  taken.  The  two  dimensions  of 
heterogeneity,  spatial  and  temporal,  are  explicitly 
modelled  as  they  have  a  different  importance  for 
different  technologies.  Using  this  framework  we  can 
simulate  different  corporate  pricing  strategies  and 
evaluate  the  benefits  generated  under  changing 
heterogeneity.  The  framework  is  tested  on  the 
introduction of HT sugar beet in the EU-27. 
Keywords— Heterogeneity, Parametric modelling, ex 
ante  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the commercial introduction of the first generation 
of genetically modified (GM) crops in agriculture, the value 
creation and benefit sharing of these technologies have been 
of great interest to society. Opponents of GM technologies 
argue that the innovating sector extracts most of the benefits 
to  the  expense  of  farmers  and  consumers.  In  contrast  to 
earlier, publicly funded innovations in agriculture, most of 
the  first-generation  GM  technologies  are  developed  and 
commercialized  by  the  private  sector.  The  laws  and 
enforcement of IPRs have provided innovating firms with 
some  monopoly  power  in  the  market  for  GM  seeds, 
affecting  the  value  creation  and  benefit  sharing  of  these 
technologies  [1,2,3,4]  The  heterogeneous  character  of 
farmers[5], results in a downward-sloping aggregate derived 
demand curve [3] and limited adoption. This suggests that, 
despite its high value, GM crops are a nondrastic innovation 
[6], because the monopolist’s pricing decision is constrained 
by  the  threat  of  competition  [7],  leading  to  ‘restricted 
monopoly pricing’ [8] and incomplete adoption [9]. 
The first generation of GM crops is out there for more 
than a decade and the first ex post impact studies uncover 
the  global  value  creation  and  benefit  sharing  of  these 
technologies.  Regardless  the  variability  of  the  impact 
estimates a review by Demont et al. [10] reveals that, on 
average, two thirds of the global benefits of first-generation 
GM technologies are shared among domestic and foreign 
farmers and consumers, while only one third is extracted by 
the  input  suppliers  (gene  developers  and  seed  suppliers), 
making abstraction of their cost structure. In this paper we 
argue that the observed formula of benefit sharing of first-
generation  GM  technologies  is  a  direct  reflection  of  the 
degree of heterogeneity of crop protection constraints and 
technology valuations in arable farming and not a strategic 
choice by the innovator. In ex post impact assessments of 
GM  crops,  the  relevant  adoption  data  are  available  and 
implicitly  incorporate  farmer  heterogeneity  [11].  Ex  ante 
assessments  should  focus  on  farmer  heterogeneity  as  the 
adopting and non-adopting farmer segments are not directly 
observable  to  the  researcher  and  homogeneity  bias  arises 
[12]. Oehmke and Wolf [13] developed a formal model of 
pricing to heterogeneous potential adopters and observed a 
strong negative correlation between monopolistic rents and 
farmer heterogeneity in the marketing of Bt cotton in the 
USA.  However,  their  model  only  includes  the  spatial 
dimension of heterogeneity, while it is common knowledge 
that  pest  infestations  –  and  hence  the  value  of  Bt 
technologies  –  are  stochastic  in  the  temporal  dimension 
[14]. Therefore we develop a 2-dimensional framework to 
fully  incorporate  farmer  heterogeneity  in  ex  ante  impact 
assessments of innovations. 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  Section  1,  we 
develop  a  theoretical  framework  for  modelling 
heterogeneity among potential adopters of a new technology 
with IPRs. Section 2 derives a demand function for the new 
technology  and  assesses  the  effect  of  heterogeneity  on 
technology pricing, adoption and benefit sharing. In Section 
3,  we  apply  the  framework  in  an  ex  ante  assessment  of 
herbicide  tolerant  (HT)  sugar  beet  adoption  in  the  EU. 
Section 4 finally concludes.   
II. IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND HETEROGENEITY 
OF TECHNOLOGY VALUATION 
We  define  an  innovative  technology  as  a  marketable 
good  which  allows  farmers  to  surmount  an  agricultural 
constraint.  Moreover,  we  introduce  the  concept  of   2 
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technology  valuation  to  represent  the  total  value  of  an 
innovative  technology  as  perceived  by  potential  adopters, 
including pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary (e.g. see [15]) 
attributes.  It  is  important  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the 
innovation  does  not  happen  in  a  vacuum.  Certain 
innovations alter the nature of production decisions from a 
set  of  independent  decisions  over  inputs  including  seed, 
pesticides  and  cultivation  methods  to  a  smaller  set  of 
choices  over  production  systems  [16].  The  value  of  an 
innovative  technology  should  then  be  calculated  as  the 
value  of  the  new  production  system.    Previous  research 
showed that the value of an innovative technology is not 
uniformly  distributed  among  adopters;  some  adopters 
realise a profit from the technology while others rationally 
choose  not  to  adopt.  Therefore  GM  crops  can  be 
distinguished from other yield increasing innovation with a 
more  universal  payoff  [5].  GM  technologies  will  pay  off 
differentially depending on field conditions, crop rotation, 
and environmental conditions. Furthermore, the technology 
valuation  to  any  particular  farm  will  depend  on  current 
machinery,  managerial  expertise,  and  local  market 
conditions  that  condition  the  profitability  of  GM 
innovations relative to alternative technologies [5]. Darr and 
Chern [18] focus on three main factors that condition the 
adoption  decision:  farm  demographics,  farm/field 
characteristics, and market and environmental factors.  In a 
study  of  adoption  in  India,  Cameron  [19]  found  similar 
results and highlighted the role of accumulated knowledge 
of the performance of the technology. Farm characteristics 
such as farm size and farm operator demographics (farmer’s 
age, experience, education), and tenure have been found to 
be statistically significant determinants [20]. These sources 
of heterogeneity can be classified in two dimensions, i.e. 
time  and  space.  Temporal  heterogeneity  arises  from  the 
stochastic nature of agricultural constraints, such as pests 
and diseases. Spatial heterogeneity originates from spatial 
variability  of  agricultural  constraints,  such  as  agro-
climatological  characteristics,  access  to  resources  and 
markets, availability of alternative technologies and human 
capital.  Technology  valuation  in  both  dimensions  is  also 
affected by the attitude towards risk of the potential adopter. 
Empirical evidence shows that most farmers are risk averse 
(e.g.  [21]).  In  addition  exhibit  decreasing  absolute  risk 
aversion,  meaning  them  adverse  to  downside  risk  [22]. 
Farmers are averse of being exposed to unexpectedly low 
returns  and  this  affects  their  technology  valuation  and 
adoption behaviour. 
In the ex post assessment of value and benefit sharing of 
an  innovative  technology,  adopters  reveal  technology 
valuation through their adoption decisions and technology 
expenditures. In the literature, ex post impact assessments of 
GM crops through cross-sectional comparisons of adopters’ 
and  non-adopters’  cropping  budgets  are  widely  accepted 
[11].  In  ex  ante  assessment  adoption  and,  hence,  self-
selection have not even been established and no empirical 
evidence is available on adopters’ revealed behaviour. Most 
ex  ante  impact  assessments  draw  from  cross-sectional 
comparisons of average cropping budgets [23,24], ignoring 
heterogeneity of farmers and producing biased results. From 
an ex ante perspective, revealed preference information of 
an  innovative  technology  is  quasi-unobservable  to  the 
researcher. Stated preference information can be collected 
through contingent valuation (CV) analysis and an expected 
demand function for the new technology can be constructed. 
However, this method requires costly survey data as surveys 
need  to  be  reproduced  in  different  years  and  different 
regions  in  order  to  capture  both  dimensions  of 
heterogeneity.  Moreover,  farmer  preferences  are  elicited 
directly based on hypothetical, rather than actual, scenarios. 
These constraints severely limit the use of CV analysis in 
large-scale ex ante impact assessments. 
Therefore,  we  propose  a  framework  that  explicitly 
models  heterogeneity  of  technology  valuation  among 
adopters  under  scarce  data.  The  conventional  direct 
approach  to  model  heterogeneity  among  producers  is 
through a probability density function (PDF) [25]. We use 
this modelling approach for heterogeneous adopters. In the 
hypothetical case of perfect information, the PDF could be 
constructed in a non-parametric way. However, in ex ante 
impact assessments imperfect information is endogenous to 
the  problem.  Therefore,  missing  data  are  replaced  by 
estimations,  assumptions  and  theory.  Hence,  parametric 
approaches are usually preferred due to small samples.  
If the new technology is a true innovation, technology 
valuation by farmers, x , is strictly positive, i.e. [ [ ∞ ∈ , 0 x . 
Farmers expressing a higher valuation of a new technology 
are more likely to adopt it. Therefore, potential adopters are 
more likely to be situated towards the upper tail of the PDF, 
while  non-adopters are more likely to populate the lower 
tail.  However,  due  to  the  two-dimensional  nature  of 
heterogeneity,  x  is  modelled  through  a  joint  PDF  of 
independent variables: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( s f t f x f s t × =  ,      (1) 
where ft(.) and fs(.) respectively represent the temporal 
and spatial marginal PDFs of x, and f(.) represents the joint 
PDF of ft(.) and fs(.). The cumulative distribution function 
(CDF)  in  turn  is  projected  in  one  dimension  in  order  to 
derive a normalized demand function [ ] 1 , 0 ) ( ∈ x Q : 
  ∫∫ =
x x
dy dt x f x F
0 0
) ( ) ( ,        (2) 
  ) ( 1 ) ( x F x Q − = .        (3)   3 
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III. CORPORATE PRICING STRATEGIES IN THE 
PRESENCE OF HETEROGENEITY 
In most ex ante impact studies the technology premium 
(θ) is exogenously introduced in the calculations. Alston et 
al. [26] endogenized θ by looking at first order statistics. 
The  technology  price  is  set  at  the  average  technology 
valuation, known as competitive pricing. Neglecting higher 
order statistics does not account for  heterogeneity and leads 
to homogeneity bias of the created welfare and a suboptimal 
profit for the innovators [12]. Homogeneity bias arises as 
well  if  only  the  temporal  dimension  of  heterogeneity  is 
taken  into  account.  Instead  of  incorporating  the  variation 
through time, the observed spatial heterogeneity is taken as 
the average through time, competitive pricing in time.  
However, innovators decide on their price level based on 
the  population  of  adopters.  Throughout  the  paper  we 
assume  that  farmers  act  rational  and  adopt  an  innovative 
technology  bundle  if 0 ≥ −θ x ,  where  θ  represents  the 
price  of  the  technology  bundle.  We  assume  that 
development  costs  are  sunk  and  not  incorporated  in  the 
pricing decision of the innovating firm. Assuming constant 
marginal  costs,  c,  the  profit  function  of  a  monopolistic 
innovator is represented by: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( θ θ θ π Q c − =          (4) 
The optimal price of the technology bundle,θ, satisfies 
the following first order condition: 
 
( )







− + = .     (5)  
Equation  5  implies  that  the  optimal  price,  set  by  the 
innovator,  depends  on  heterogeneity  of  technology 
valuation in both the temporal and spatial dimension and 
their interaction.  
Some  first  comparative  statistics  of  can  be  calculated 
using the implicit function theorem and parameterizing the 
function. Suppose that the distribution is characterized by a 
mean, µ, and standard deviation, τ, which yields 
( ) F c dF d








   (6) 
where subscript means partial differentiation. In order to 
determine  the  sign  of  the  derivative  we  need  extra 
assumptions.  Suppose  that  dF  is  unimodal  with  concave 
tails and θ lies on the lower tail. Then the denominator is 
negative  and  the  nominator  becomes  positive  as  c 
approaches  0.  In  the  case  profit  maximization  and  the 
assumption surrounding p, this means that as the average 
valuation increases, the technology premium will follow.  
The effect of a change in variance is determined by 
( ) F c dF d








   (7) 
Under  the  same  assumptions,  this  derivative  will  be 
negative. This means the innovator will drop the price in 
order  to  maintain  his  customer  base  as  the  variance  or 
heterogeneity increases. These simple comparative statistics 
however do not give us enough information. We can not 
assess  the  impact  of  the  two  dimensions,  the  impact  on 
profits or the effect of risk attitudes. Due to poor analytical 
tractability of the models comparative dynamics, numerical 
simulation  is  used  to  examine  these  effects.  In  order  to 
examine the effect of the two dimensional heterogeneity on 
the  value  creation  and  the  corporate  pricing  strategy  we 
assume heterogeneity is distributed through a joint Gaussian 
distribution among farmers with fs(s) ~ ￿(µs, σ
2) and ft(x) ~ 
￿(µt,  τ
2).  The  profit  function  for  the  innovating  firm 
changes to 
  ) , , , ( ). ( ) , , , ( τ σ µ θ θ τ σ µ θ π Q C − = .  (8) 
The  standard  deviation  of  is  an  adequate  measure  of 
heterogeneity.  Without  loss  of  generality  we 
assume 500 = = t s µ µ and we keep spatial heterogeneity 
constant while varying the value of temporal heterogeneity 
(because  the  normal  distribution  is  symmetrical).  We 
assume  that  the  temporal  heterogeneity  is  always  smaller 
than or equals the spatial heterogeneity. The results can be 
seen in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 
 
Table 1 The effect of heterogeneity on technology fee, adoption and value creation 
σ   τ   θ   π   Adoption  Benefit farmer  Value 
100  20  467.1  458.4  98%  75.1  542.2 
100  40  454.1  435.7  96%  93.4  547.5 
100  60  448.8  421.9  94%  110.5  559.3 
100  80  446.9  413.2  92%  115.2  562.1 
100  100  446.4  407.3  91%  124.8  571.2 
100  Assumed 0 but in 
reality 40 
391.0  383.6  98%  152.0  543.0   4 
12





















Figure 1 The effect of heterogeneity on the technology fee 
 
Heterogeneity  in  the  temporal  dimension  has  a 
downward  effect  on  θ .  If  heterogeneity  increases,  the 
density function will become flatter and more scattered. The 
innovator has to lower his price in order to capture a market 
share  allowing  him  to  maximize  his  profit.  The  effect  of 
increasing  heterogeneity  reduces  if  the  heterogeneity 
becomes prominent. If the innovator would choose to price 
the technology competitive in time, we get a θ  which is 
clearly lower than when both dimensions are being taken 
into account. Using equation 4 and assuming marginal costs 
are zero we can calculate the profit the innovator makes. 
Another factor influencing the technology valuation is the 
risk aversion of the potential adopter. Under risk aversion 
the technology valuation is  affected by a higher variance 
and increases the effect of heterogeneity. The classic mean 
variance  approach  as  shown  above  can  be  supplemented 
with  a  third  standard  moment,  the  skewness.  Under 
downside  risk  aversion,  as  is  the  case  with  farmers  (cfr. 
supra), the technology valuation will be positively skewed 
[27].  In  order  to  assess  this  effect  a  lognormal  function 
would be needed in further research (ongoing).  
These results bearing in mind, if IPRs are strong, and the 
market  structure  is  suitable,  third  degree  price 
discrimination  might  be  a  profitable  strategy  for  the 
innovator. Since price discrimination in the seed sector has 
to be spatial, it is the variance of ft(t) in each submarket 
which is diminished. For Bt cotton this is the case in the US 
[28]. Monsanto owning the patents on key genetic events, 
could require the farmer to sign a technology contract with a 
“no resale” clause in it, hereby strengthening its monopoly 
power. The spatial heterogeneity in technology valuation is 
further diminished by the sensitive reaction of upland cotton 
varieties  to  agro-climatic  changes  [4].  In  Europe,  price 
discrimination  can  be  found  in  Bt  maize  in  spain  [29]. 
These observations show that the innovator is aware that 
patent-based  uniform  pricing  of  a  GM-related  innovation 
leaves  substantial  benefits  with  the  producers,  preventing 
full appropriation by the innovator due to the heterogeneity 
among  farmers  [5].  Vertical  integration  and  contracting 
might  provide  effective  mechanisms  for  increased 
appropriation. 
The gross value of the crop for farmers in turn can 
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But because of the θ  and the rationality of adopters, it is 
important  to  determine  the  marginal  adopter  [30].  First a 
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The net value of the new technology, α , for all adopters 





θ θ θ α d f t a ) ( ). ( .    (12) 
In  Table  1  we  can  see  the  effect  of  increasing 
heterogeneity  and  risk  aversion  on  the  farmer  value.  The 
benefits accruing to farmers rise if the heterogeneity among 
farmers  augments.  This  explained  by  the  reduced 
technology fee and the increased amount of farmers which 
can gain a lot from the technology. We can also see that if 
the innovator chooses to price the innovation competitive in 
time, the benefits accruing to farmers become much higher 
(€152/ha versus €93/ha). In the case heterogeneity in both 
the  spatial  and  temporal  dimension  is  zero,  α   becomes 
zero and the whole created benefit accrues to the innovator 
itself in the form ofθ  and full adoption would be reached. 
This situation could be reached in cases of contracting or 
vertical integration.   5 
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IV. HETEROGENEITY IN TECHNOLOGY 
VALUATION IN THE CASE OF HT SUGAR BEET 
IN EUROPE 
A. Selection of a European case study 
The  case  of  HT  sugar  beet  is  very  appealing  for  EU 
agriculture as this crop is grown in most EU countries. We 
understood  that  the  major  impediment  comes  from  the 
concentrated  group  of  refiners,  processors  and 
manufacturers  of  sugar  and  sugar-containing  products. 
Processors face risks related to market acceptability of sugar 
and by-products [31]. However recently, it seems the sugar 
processors  have  opened  their  doors  to  biotechnology 
following  the  food  and  feed  approval  in  Australia,  New 
Zeeland,  Japan  and  the  EU.  HT  sugar  beets  are 
commercially introduced glyphosate in  the USA in 2008. 
These events combined with the increasing importance of 
sugar  beets  as  a  raw  material  for  biofuels  makes  the 
introduction of HT sugar beets becomes reasonable for the 
EU in the future. 
B. Modelling heterogeneity among sugar beet farmers in the 
EU 
For  economic  sugar  beet  production,  effective  weed 
control is crucial. Yield losses can be up to 100%, such is 
the poor ability of beet to compete with the large range of 
weeds present in arable soils [32]. Because of the economic 
importance,  the  cost  of  herbicide  use  is  the  determining 
factor  in  the  technology  valuation  of  HT  sugar  beet.  In 
contrast to pests and diseases, the infestation level of weeds 
is constant over time, which means the temporal dimension 
of heterogeneity is zero. A one-dimensional representation 
of heterogeneity seems to be sufficient for HT sugar beet. In 
the  case  of  Bt  crops,  the  temporal  dimension  plays  a 
important role because insect populations vary through time 
which  makes  a  two-dimensional  approach  necessary. 
Herbicide  and  application  costs  for  the  EU  countries  are 
reported  by  Hermann  [33,34,35].  These  values  indicate 
some heterogeneity, but in order to construct the expected 
demand curve we need the PDF. Survey results from the 
Netherlands [36]  and France have been analysed  [37,38] 
and  the  CDF  best  fitting  on  these  data  is  the  loglogistic 



















x CDF     (12) 
with  γ   en  δ   scale  and  shape  parameter  respectively 





Table 2 Fitted CDF around survey data of herbicide expenditures in sugar beet 
  Model: x=1/(1+(Herbicide exp/γ )**(-δ ))     
  Dep. var: x Loss: (OBS-PRED)**2       
  France,1997  France,2000  Netherlands,2004 
  γ   δ   γ   δ   γ   δ  
Estimate  103.3  4.8  160.2  4.7  803.3  5.0 
Std.Err.  1.0  0.2  0.4  0.04  3.7  0.1 
t  94.1  22.1  440.4  101.5  214.2  47.1 
p-level  3.3E-22  7.5E-13  0  0  0  0 
R  0.99852    0.99981    0.99917   
 
   6 
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Table 3 Herbicide PDF based on herbicide product and application costs in the EU-27 (real 2007 currency) 
Sources: Hermann [33,34,35] and Schaüfele [45] 
a Portugal identical to Spain 
b No data from Hermann, data from [46] 
c No data from Schaüfele, data from Germany 
d We use one constant price throughout the EU in order to keep the analysis transparent. 
d No data from 2004  
 
 Comparing the expert values with the fitted distribution 
delivers percentiles for each of the three expert values. We 
assume these percentiles remain constant for the different 
EU  member  states.  It  seems  reasonable  the  concept  of 
minimum,  average  and  maximum  remained  the  same  for 
Hermann throughout the Member States. This allows us to 
construct a loglogistic PDF for the technology valuation for 
each Member State of the EU-27 in 2004 (Table 3 in real 
2007 currency). The omitted Member States only produce 
4% of the EU production. The distribution in technology 
































































x F     (14) 
with  x  herbicide  expenditure,  γ   and  δ the  scale  and 
shape parameter respectively and red the reduction of prices 
in the conventional herbicide market. Since herbicides are 
protected with IPR, producers also possesses some kind of 
market  power  which  allows  them  to  sell  at  price  levels 
above the marginal cost. When a new competing technology 
enters the market, the producers of conventional herbicides 
will react  with a price reduction. This reaction  has taken 
place with the introduction of HT soybeans in the US and 
can be seen with the introduction of generic products on the 
herbicide  market  [39].  A  price  reduction  of  20%  on  the 
competing the conventional herbicide in Europe following 









Distribution herbicide costs  nc  ng  g     
(l/ha) 





Austria  156  311  467  Loglogistic(0; 260.8; 5.4323)  2.5  2.5  6  41.5  4.37 
Belgium  104  261  417  Loglogistic(0; 206.59; 4.2293)  3.5       2.5  6  18.5  4.37 
Germany  76  206  334  Loglogistic(0; 160.33; 3.9367)  3  2.5  6  18.2  4.37 
Spain  141  261  381  Loglogistic(0; 222.94; 6.0868)  3  1  3  13.0  4.37 
Czech 
Republic 
138  198  276  Loglogistic(0; 180.12; 9.9884)  3
c  2.5
c  6  2.5  4.37 
France  103  150  206  Loglogistic(0; 135.78; 9.7149)  3.8  2.5  6  20.0  4.37 
Finland  154  220  297  Loglogistic(0; 200.67; 10.044)  3.8  2.5  6  16.4  4.37 
Greece  94  132  202  Loglogistic(0; 121.06; 10.519)  1.5  1  3  17.5  4.37 
Italy  95  169  253  Loglogistic(0; 145.32; 6.3659)  2.5  2.5  6  15.3  4.37 
Ireland  64  93  122  Loglogistic(0; 84.422; 9.68)  3  2.5  6  13.3  4.37 
Netherlands  135  176  238  Loglogistic(0; 164.32; 13.483)  3.5  2.5  6  40.4  4.37 
Poland  121  214  332  Loglogistic(0; 184.91; 6.3962)  3
c  2.5
c  6  7.3  4.37 
Sweden  77  186  308  Loglogistic(0; 148.56; 4.2881)  2.9  2.5  6  13.3  4.37 
UK
e  78  149  225.  Loglogistic(0; 124.05; 5.9299)  4.6  2.5  6  14.4  4.37 
Denmark
e  88  212  372  Loglogistic(0; 165.51; 4.3522)  4
  2.5  6  26.0  4.37 
Portugal
a  141  261  381  Loglogistic(0; 222.94; 6.0868)  3  1  3  13.9  4.37 
Hungary
b  64  159  211  Loglogistic(0;132.28;2.7296)  3.3
c  2.5
c  6  2.5  4.37   7 
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C. Corporate pricing strategy 
Before a price decision about the optimal θ  can be made 
by  the  innovator,  the  demand  function  is  needed.  Using 
equation 3 and 4 we can construct the normalized demand 
function for each member state, 
  ) ( 1 ) ( θ θ Cd Q − =         (15) 
with  g pgl k ng nc x . ). ( − − + = θ     (16) 
representing the price difference in total application cost 
between the old and the new bundle and with nc and ng the 
number  of  applications  for  conventional  and  glyphosate 
respectively, k the cost of one application, pgl the price for a 
litre glyphosate and g the dosage of glyphosate (Table 3). 
This  way  of  calculating  the  technology  valuation  follows 
from  the  production  system  approach  (cfr.supra).  From 
which the profit function becomes: 
  n Q ). ).( ( ) ( θ θ θ π =        (17) 
if we assume marginal costs are zero and n the total area 
planted with sugar beet from F.O.Licht [40], the technology 
fee,θ , can be retrieved using equation 5.  
Although the data is available to the innovator to price 
discriminate (results in Table 4), the situation in the sugar 
industry  does  not  favour  this  pricing  strategy.  The  sugar 
sector is highly concentrated and vertically coordinated. The 
sugar producer buys the seed from the seed company and 
supplies  them  to  the  farmers  in  a  highly  coordinated 
contract. Due to these contracts, the amount of seed buyers 
on the market, which often operate in multiple countries, is 
small  and  price  discrimination  among  countries  is 
unrealistic.  A  uniform  pricing  strategy  seems  the  more 
realistic option given these constraints. This assumption is 
confirmed by the uniform pricing strategy upon introduction 
of  HT  sugar  beet  in  the  VS  [41].  A  demand  function  is 
constructed  based  on  the  production-weighted  average  of 
the  countries  responsible  for  75%  of  the  European 




n share x Cd x F . ) ( ) ( ∑ =       (18) 
with n the number of countries taken into account and 
sharen  the  share  in  production  over  the  n  countries. 
Applying equation 12-17 while replacing the parameters by 
their weighted average gives us the uniform technology fee 
of €88/ha for 2004 (Table 5). The calculated technology fee 
seems rather high compared with other crops. However they 
are  in  line  with  the  prices  for  the  introduction  from  HT 
sugar  beet  in  the  VS,  €90-106/ha  [41].  This  can  be 
explained by the high economic importance of herbicides in 
the growing stage of sugar beet compared to the other crops 
assessed. 
D. Value of the innovation to farmers, innovator and the 
total value 
A common measure of the value of a GM crop is the 
value per ha. In order to calculate the value per ha, or the 
rents,  accruing  to  farmers,  we  use  the  land  function  as 
introduced by Lapan and Moschini [42] in the case of  HT 
soybeans. The land function is calibrated on real observed 
data [43] and uses, 
  dx x i x f i a i
j i





with  i i i i i i k nc ng g pgl ). ( . lim − + + = θ   (19) 



















i x f ρ     (21) 
and i (1…17) the Member States. 
The  results  can  be  seen  in  Table  4  and  Table  5.   8 
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Table 4 Technology fee, farmer rent and innovators profit under price discrimination 






Value of the crop (€/ha) 
Belgium  123    131  8.1  254 
Denmark  106    122  4.3  228 
Germany  94    99  26.5  193 
Greece  75    95  2.2  170 
Spain  145    135  12.9  280 
France  87    133  27.0  220 
Ireland  50    32  0.7  82 
Italy  77    59  9.7  136 
The Netherlands  121    118  11.2  239 
Austria  147    123  4.9  270 
Portugal  170    145  1.2  315 
Finland  125    68  3.5  193 
Sweden  86    74  2.5  160 
United Kingdom  78    117  8.8  195 
Czech Republic  98    87  5.6  185 
Hungary  108    63  2.6  171 
Poland  102    79  22.4  181 
EU-27      average 99  154.0  average 204 
 
 
Table 5 Technology fee, farmer rent and innovators profit under uniform pricing 




Value of the crop (€/ha) 
Belgium  88    174  7.2  262 
Denmark  88    145  4.0  233 
Germany  88    108  26.3  196 
Greece  88    63  1.8  151 
Spain  88    192  9.0  280 
France  88    131  26.9  219 
Ireland  88    1  0.003  89 
Italy  88    45  8.6  133 
The Netherlands  88    151  8.6  239 
Austria  88    188  3.8  276 
Portugal  88    223  0.7  311 
Finland  88    102  2.7  190 
Sweden  88    71  2.5  159 
United Kingdom  88    99  8.5  187 
Czech Republic  88    101  5.6  189 
Hungary  88    78  2.4  166 
Poland  88    96  22.0  184 
EU 27      average116  141.0  average 204 
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Third degree price discrimination allows the innovator to 
make a profit at least as high as uniform pricing as predicted 
by  the  framework.  The  farmer  rent  under  price 
discrimination  is  lower  than  under  uniform  pricing  as 
expected. The bigger heterogeneity in the case of uniform 
pricing makes more benefits accruing to farmers. The total 
value  per  ha  is  composed  by  the  technology  fee  and  the 
rents  and  remains  the  same  under  both  corporate  pricing 
strategies. However, the reaction of the total value per ha 
with increasing heterogeneity depends on the distribution of 
technology valuation. The increase in farmer benefit can be 
offset by the decrease in technology fee. It is clear from the 
results  that  the  sharing-out  between  upstream  and 
downstream  will  be  affected  by  the  amount  of 
heterogeneity.  However,  Frisvold  [44]  argues  that  the 
sharing-out  can  not  be  addressed  adequately  without 
aggregating the results and integrating market effects. The 
aggregation of benefits upon introduction of HT sugar beet 
in the world can be found in [43] which in detail describes 
the aggregation and the policies affecting the sharing-out.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Heterogeneity  among  potential  adopters  of  a  new 
technology is an important determinant in the outcome of 
impact assessments of new technologies. In ex post impact 
studies, the heterogeneity is endogenous to the real adoption 
data.  In  ex  ante  impact  assessment  however,  the 
heterogeneity has to be modelled explicitly. Heterogeneity 
arises from two sources, temporal and spatial. The results of 
our three-dimensional framework show both of them affect 
the expected demand curve for a new technology. Based on 
this expected demand curve, the private innovator will set 
his price in order to capture monopoly rents based on IPRs. 
Increasing  heterogeneity  makes  an  optimal  pricing  of  the 
technology difficult and decreases both the technology fee 
and the profit for the innovator. On the other hand, the more 
farmers  vary  in  their  valuation  of  a  new  technology,  the 
bigger the rents accruing to them. The typical heterogeneity 
among farmers explains the rule of thumb in sharing-out, 
1/3  upstream  and  2/3  downstream.  In  the  extreme  case 
heterogeneity would be absent, the whole value of a crop 
would accrue to the innovator in the form of a perfect priced 
technology  fee.  These  results  can  have  important 
consequences  for  future  innovations  in  agriculture.  Most 
innovations have the tendency to decrease the difference in 
technology valuation among farmers. For instance, farmers 
adopting  HT  crops  will  replace  several  different 
conventional  herbicides  by  one  systemic,  broad-spectrum 
herbicide.  The  easiness  of  management  increases  and 
differences in application rates reduces. Another strategy for 
the  farmer  could  be  to  reduce  the  risk  through  selling 
insurance  and  as  such  reduce  the  variance  in  technology 
variation. All of this makes the technology valuation much 
more  homogeneous  among  farmers.  The  decreased 
heterogeneity  among  farmers  allows  the  innovator  of  a 
future innovation, protected by IPR’s, to introduce its next 
innovation at a better targeted, profit optimizing technology 
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